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Abstract:  Many medical systems are currently equipped with a large number of tiny,   
non-invasive sensors, located on, or close to, the patient’s body for health monitoring 
purposes. These groupings of sensors constitute a body sensor network (BSN). Key 
management is a fundamental service for medical BSN security. It provides and manages 
the cryptographic keys to enable essential security features such as confidentiality, 
integrity and authentication. Achieving key agreement in BSNs is a difficult task. Many 
key agreement schemes lack sensor addition, revocation, and rekeying properties, which 
are very important. Our proposed protocol circumvents these shortcomings by providing 
node rekeying properties, as well as node addition and revocation. It proposes a key 
distribution protocol based on public key cryptography—the RSA (Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman) algorithm, and the DHECC (Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve Cryptography) 
algorithm. The proposed protocol does not trust individual sensors, and partially trusts the 
base station (hospital). Instead of loading full pair-wise keys into each node, after 
installation our protocol establishes pair-wise keys between nodes according to a specific 
routing algorithm. In this case, each node doesn’t have to share a key with all of its 
neighbors, only those involved in the routing path; this plays a key role in increasing the 
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resiliency against node capture attacks and the network storage efficiency. Finally we 
evaluate our algorithm from the BSN security viewpoint and evaluate its performance in 
comparison with other proposals.  
Keywords: body sensor network; RSA; DHECC; rekeying  
 
1. Introduction 
The term body sensor network (BSN) [1] was coined to represent human body sensing applications 
in which a number of intelligent physiological sensors are integrated into a wearable wireless BSN, 
which can be used for computer assisted rehabilitation and/or the early detection of medical conditions. 
Such applications imply that outpatients can be monitored from their homes, freeing up space in 
hospital beds. As there is a legal requirement to keep patients’ physiological data private, any 
implemented network must include strong security protocols. However, its physical characteristics 
make incorporating security a challenging task. The constraints on sensors make the design and 
operation of contemporary networks exceedingly different. The existing security mechanisms for 
wired and wireless networks cannot be applied to BSNs, because of the constrained energy, memory 
and computational capability of the latter. 
Key management protocols are at the core of secure communications. The goal of key management 
is to establish secure links between neighbor sensors in networks to exchange their data in a multi-hop 
fashion. Public key schemes have many advantages, such as low communication overhead, and good 
storage capability and scalability. These schemes can provide simpler solutions with much stronger 
security strength. Several researchers [2,3] have shown that public key schemes are valid on sensor 
nodes. The computational cost is expected to fall faster than the cost to transmit and receive. 
Furthermore, next generation sensor nodes are expected to combine ultra-low power circuitry allowing 
for a continuous energy supply. 
The protocol proposed in this paper will circumvent the shortcoming of needing to provide the 
rekeying of nodes that occurs with previous algorithms, as well as node addition and revocation [4,5]. 
Therefore, with the fast growing technology, public key schemes are no longer impractical and are 
expected to be widely used in the near future [3]. RSA, elliptic curve and public key cryptography are 
all viable options on an 8-bit CPU. The relative performance advantage of ECC point multiplication 
over RSA modular exponentiation is inversely proportional to processor word size and directly 
proportional to key size [6]. 
Gateways have considerably high energy resources compared to sensor nodes and are equipped 
with high performance processors and more memory. The base station performs network management 
functions in a centralized fashion; constructing the Routing-Path-Table [7] for each node, depending 
on the installation knowledge. In location based routing, nodes are addressed by means of their 
locations [8]. We assume that each sensor has direct communication with the base station during key 
management operations, i.e., the formation phase. Consequently, we will analyze the security strength 
of our proposal with many desirable security attributes to infer its success; our algorithm will also be 
compared with previous studies to evaluate its performance behavior.  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work, Section 3 
discusses the system architecture, Section 4 proposes our new algorithm, Section 5 evaluates the 
security properties, Section 6 analyzes our scheme’s performance, and finally, Section 7 concludes the 
paper and illustrates the future research. 
2. Related Work 
The following section discusses some of the published BSN authentication and key agreement 
schemes. Topics related to BSN efficiency and its shortcomings according to the desirable security 
attributes that will be discussed below will also be illustrated. Pre-loaded symmetric shared keys are 
used in large scale sensor networks for geographical region observations [9,10]. In these techniques, a 
certain key is loaded in each node and used to derive a shared secret key. Balfanz et al. [11] utilized a 
secure-limited channel (e.g., infrared) to exchange public-keys between parties prior to the 
authentication process. However, this approach requires huge resources, which would be difficult to 
provide in medical environments. Human confirmation of correct association is also difficult when 
based on public-keys and without visual cues. The resurrecting duckling protocol [12] establishes a 
master-slave relationship between devices whereby the first device in contact with a sensor becomes 
its master and can upload policies to the sensor that permits interactions with other devices. Sensors 
from previous patients have to be explicitly disassociated by the master before they can be reused by 
other patients, which may not always be practical in hospitals. 
Jiang et al. [13] use self-certified keys (SCK) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to establish 
pair-wise keys for authentication. Each sensor agrees upon a secret with the user based on the secret 
information pre-loaded by a key distribution centre (KDC). Authentication is achieved if the user 
demonstrates knowledge of the shared secret-key with at least t sensors. To achieve a sensor to patient 
association, each patient’s BSN would require different ECC curve parameters (as each BSN is a 
domain), which would be impractical for the hundreds of BSN in a hospital. SNAP [14] also uses ECC 
to establish pair-wise keys between nodes and the gateway. It requires that each sensor be equipped 
with a biometric device to authenticate the patient and uses the shared secret to communicate with the 
base station. However, it does not establish group keys. Many studies have been conducted to address 
ECC-based public-key cryptography [15]. It has been found to be viable for resource constrained 
wireless sensor networks, providing better key distribution, management and authentication. 
In a medical environment, those techniques are not sufficient, as the wireless domains of groups 
may overlap and only the correct sensors must be associated with each patient. Hence, the rekeying 
property regarding node addition and revocation is not applicable for these protocols. In addition, the 
pair-wise key agreement approach can’t provide resiliency against node capturing attacks and also has 
storage efficiency issues. From that regard our protocol has to provide the rekeying feature with key 
addition and key revocation options, as well as consider the storage efficiency and resiliency by the 
utilization of a specific routing algorithm in the key agreement process. 
3. The System Architecture 
The network topological structure is illustrated in Figure 1. The network includes gateway and 
sensor nodes. A gateway is less energy constrained and tamper resistant, as compared to other nodes. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Sensor nodes can communicate with each other. The gateway is assumed to be secure and trusted by 
all nodes in the network, as soon as nodes have been loaded. Upon the knowledge of sensor nodes’ 
positions, the gateway begins the calculation of the routing path, considering the communication path 
for each node to reach the gateway hop by hop, conduct a data aggregation, and then position the 
network nodes with a distribution of shared session keys calculated with the cooperation of each node. 
The routing algorithm must be adaptive to locate alternative routing paths for each node to reach its 
destination, considering the trust and cost parameters of the route selections that avoid loops [16]. 
Figure 1. The Proposed Key Agreement Protocol in Body Sensor Network.  
 
Involving the routing technique for the BSN provides a higher level of connectivity with a relatively 
small number of neighbor-shared keys. Compared with a pair-wise key distribution [17], this algorithm 
has to obtain an optimal routing path without considering the necessity of a mesh implantation 
topology, hence, by analogy, the fully mesh connected regular network is equal to the pair-wise key 
distribution BSN linking. According to a specified routing algorithm, each node doesn’t have to share 
a key with all radio-range neighbors, only those involved in the routing path.  
4. Proposed Protocol Description 
Some researchers have previously shown that with an accurate design, the widely used RSA public 
key cryptosystem [18] and DHECC key agreement techniques [19] can be deployed on even the most 
constrained of current sensor network devices. Watro et al. [20] proposed a mechanism for providing 
authentication and key exchange based on the well-known RSA cryptosystem, using  3 = e  as the public 
exponent for MICA1 Motes [21]. These devices carry an Atmel ATmega 128L microcontroller with a Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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CPU of 4 MHz of 4 KB RAM and 128 KB flash memory. The security properties of the Low 
Exponent variant of RSA have been studied thoroughly [22]. The proposed protocol notations are 
mentioned in Table 1. 
Table 1. The Proposed Protocol Notation. 
Notation Description  
 P,Q  Two large and distinct random primes. 
 m  PQ multiplication such that  ( ) ( )( ) 11 mP Q φ =− − . 
 e  ( ) 1, em φ << and  ( ) 1 em φ << . 
  The multiplicative inverse of  ( ) mod . em φ  
  The generating element of DHECC. 
  The order of G. 
 Si Sensor node number i. 
 ri  Random integers chosen by Si. 
 ti  Ephemeral public keys:  ti ≡ G × ri. 
 xi   The private long-term keys of Si. 
 yi   Si long-term public keys: yi ≡ G × xi. 
 idi  The identification of Si.
The shared secret for the patent number i. 
  The shared secret for the shared cluster number j. 
Table 2. The Proposed Key Agreement Protocol. 
Before Installation: Key Pre-loading Phase
  , , ,   
 ,  ,  ,   
After Installation: Vector Exchanging Phase  
   
   
Key Establishment Phase  
   
The Steady State (Rekeying) Phase 
   
 
   
   
The proposed key agreement protocol is provided in Table 2 which is explained as follows: 
4.1. Key Pre-Loading Phase 
The gateway is loaded with its public and private keys of the RSA cryptosystem, which means that 
m and e are the Gateway public keys, and d, such that  () 1mod ed m φ ≡ is the gateway’s private key. In 
d
G
n
i P Z
Cj Z
GW = mP Qe d i y
i S i x i y e = mP Q
→ i SG W() mod
e
ii ri d m 7
→ i GW S iC j xZ
i S = Cj i Cj i x x ZZ
→ i SG W() m o d ′
e
ii ri d m 7
′ → ii SS () ′
Cj ii i E ri dr 77 Z
→ i GW S ′ iC j xZ
′ i S
?
′ = Cj Cj ZZSensors 2011, 11                                       
 
 
5840
addition, the gateway is loaded with the public keys of all sensor nodes yi. Each sensor node is loaded 
with its DHECC private key xi and the public keys of the gateway m and e. 
4.2. Key Establishment Phase 
Step 1: All sensors generate an ephemeral random key ri, concatenate it with idi and encrypt the 
result with the gateway public key to obtain () mod
e
ii ri d m 7 . We assume that each sensor begins the 
session with maximum transmission power to reach the gateway.  
Step 2: The gateway decrypts the received vectors coming from all sensors with its private key 
() () mod ≡
ed
ii ii ri d ri d m 77to obtain ri for each Si. According to the routing map, after the gateway has 
been calculated, it starts to send the session keys to each node, as shown in Figure 1. The nodes S1, S2, 
S3, and S4 are from the same cluster PI, and as such, they will obtain the same session key. 
Step 3: The gateway responds to these nodes by sending  ( )
1234 =+ + +
I PS S S S Gr r r r Z encrypted by the 
DH long term private key for each node. For example, node  1 S  will receive  ( )
11 2 3 4 +++ SS S S S yr r r r, 
from the gateway and then  1 S  will calculate ( )( )
11 1 2 3 4 =+ + +
I PS S S S S S yx r r r r Z . As such, we realize that 
many nodes can share more than one cluster, which also means that they share more than one key. This 
manner of key distribution primarily depends on the routing path established by the gateway. 
4.3. The Steady State Phase 
Considering node S1 that would like to send information to the gateway through
→→→→
1
1258
II I I I PCPP
SSSSG W , it sends its information to node S2, encrypted with ZPI. S2 then forwards it to 
deliver S5 encrypted with ZC1, and S5 delivers it to S8 encrypted with ZPII. Finally, S8 delivers it to the 
gateway encrypted with ZPII. Node S1 has alternative routing paths, to be used as needed, and therefore, 
the established session key between nodes is used later for a symmetric encryption for secure data 
forwarding to the gateway. 
After a random period of time, any node in the cluster could initiate the rekeying in the following 
two steps: 
Step 1: Si generates another ephemeral random key  ′ i r and send it to the gateway in the same fashion 
as the second phase. In a parallel fashion, Si sends this new ephemeral key  ′ i r concatenated with its idi 
concatenated with the present ephemeral key ri to its neighbors encrypted with the shared session key 
between them () ′
Pi ii i Er i d r 77 Z . 
Step 2: The gateway establishes a new session key for this cluster and sends it to the cluster nodes, 
while the cluster nodes themselves have calculated this new key by decrypting the received vector 
from node Si. They can replace the old ri with the new  ′ i r and compare the new key that comes from the 
gateway with the key they have calculated to validate the integrity. 
4.4. Key Revocation and Addition 
The applicability of the additively homomorphic DHECC algorithms plays a key role in the nodes’ 
addition and revocation. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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The revocation: In the case of node capturing, or when a predefined value of a node life time is 
reached, the gateway begins the revocation by removing the current ephemeral random key for this 
node from the session key shared with this node’s neighbors. The gateway then resends the new key to 
all neighbors encrypted with their static private key. Consequently, we consider that the gateway has 
the ability to detect the nodes’ capture [23]. 
The addition: Establishing a key for a new node loaded by its public and private keys,  i x ,  i y  and 
the gateway public key  = mP Q , with the network sensor nodes is similar to Vector Exchanging and 
the Key Establishment Phases. We assume that the gateway is informed by the public key of the new 
node before node installation. 
5. Security Analysis  
The inherent security [24] relies on the difficulty of recovering this key via the factorization of large 
integers. It is generally accepted that RSA keys should be a minimum of 1,024 bits. Discrete logarithm 
cryptography (DLC) is another area of cryptography where security is provided by difficulty in solving 
logarithmic equations over large finite groups. Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a subset of 
DLP, where the discrete logarithmic solutions occur over an equation of a plane curve. Wireless 
networks are more vulnerable to attacks than their wired counterparts, due to the nature of wireless 
transmission, resource limitations and uncontrolled environments that represent a great challenge in 
BSN security. BSNs have the following security requirements [25,26]: 
Known Key Security: The protocol should still achieve its goal in the face of an adversary who has 
learned other session keys Zcj. Hence, each run of the protocol between the nodes and the gateway 
produce a unique session key that depends on the random ephemeral keys ri  of nodes Si. The 
adversary, who learned some other session keys, can’t predict new or subsequent session keys Zcj 
(forward secrecy), and also can’t predict any earlier session keys (backward secrecy). 
Key Control: Neither of the principles who share the key agreement process are able to force the 
key to be any chosen value, otherwise, one party could force the use of an old key, key disposable 
safety. One potential benefit is that each principle doesn’t have to rely on any other party to generate 
appropriate keys. As long as neither party is malicious, it can often be guaranteed that the session key 
Zcj
 
is a sufficiently random input. A related benefit is that principals can often be sure that the session 
key is fresh by ensuring that their own input is fresh. Consequently, involving an ephemeral random 
key generated by each node i r to share the session key establishment is to grant the key freshness of the 
session key and provide the key control property. 
Implicit Key Authentication:  A key establishment protocol is said to provide implicit key 
authentication (of Si to the gateway) if the gateway is assured that no other node Si, aside from the 
specifically identified Si, can learn the value of a particular secret key. A key agreement protocol 
which provides implicit key authentication to both participating principals is called the authenticated 
key agreement (AK) protocol. Our algorithm implicitly authenticates the exchanged information 
sensor nodes and the gateway using the long term private keys of others.  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Key Confirmation: A key agreement protocol satisfies key confirmation; if one party is assured 
that all other parties have possession of a particular secret key, through the rekeying process, then the 
new session keys established by the gateway are compared with their similar, node self generation, 
keys. The lack of termination means that each node has the correct key, thus, the gateway confirms 
that the sensor nodes possess the correct secret key. This property only covers the steady state 
(rekeying) phase, a very frequent process. If this isn’t the case, node addition and revocation, the 
sensor nodes, have to trust the gateway; this is referred to as the partial trust of the gateway.  
Explicit Key Authentication: If both implicit key authentications and key confirmations are provided. 
Node Capture: Each node is pre-loaded with a unique private and public key of itself, the gateway 
public key, and a random ephemeral session key, revealed by node capturing. In this case, they cannot 
provide any profit to the intruder about the network, or the rest of the nodes. Our proposal achieves a 
good degree of resilience against node capture, because of the key freshness. 
Scalability:  The ability to support larger networks by adding more nodes is already provided 
through this algorithm, as discussed previously. The key distribution mechanism supports large 
networks and is flexible against a substantial increase in the size of the network after installation. 
Confidentiality: This aspect is ensured by using symmetric encryption to encrypt the exchanged 
traffic by the established session keys between sensors. The confidentiality is conducted using periodic 
key freshness to prevent long term attacks. 
Key Freshness: The derived session key must be fresh, as opposed to the reuse of old keying 
material. Since sensors generate the random integer ri for each session, we guarantee the key freshness 
property. We can also refer to this property as the ability to resist predictable attacks. 
6. Performance Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the performance of our algorithm with respect to storage and 
computational costs. 
6.1. Storage Analysis 
The storage complexity is the amount of memory (RAM size) required to store security credentials. 
The storage complexity in turn affects the hardware cost of sensor nodes. Our proposal considers the 
base station as the resource-rich node. Other schemes depend on key distribution before installation, 
which involves a tradeoff between the numbers of keys each node must store (storage) and the number 
of secure links between the nodes in the resulting network (connectivity). Our proposal achieves a key 
agreement system after deployment, according to a routing strategy. The many-to-one traffic pattern 
dominates in typical sensor networks, where all sensors send data to one sink [27]. Because of the 
many-to-one traffic pattern, a sensor node only communicates with a small portion of its neighbors, 
e.g., neighbor sensors that are in the routes from itself to the sink [28,29]. This means that a sensor 
node does not require shared keys with all neighbors. By consulting the datasheet of the PIC 
Microcontroller PIC18F2550 [30], we find that it has RAM of 2 Kbytes and a ROM of 24 Kbytes, 
which is enough for key generation for RSA (2 Kbytes).  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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The implementation of the prime field algorithms used 635 bytes of RAM (data) memory and  
4,072 bytes of ROM (program) memory. This accounts for approximately 31% of the RAM (data) 
memory and approximately 13% of the ROM (program) memory available on the microcontroller [30]. 
Table 3 comes from a Standard Datasheet for the microcontroller which we have used; it also shows a 
comparison of different microcontrollers from the same family, and highlights the most important 
characteristics RAM, ROM which is critical when implementing cryptography algorithms on a small 
microcontroller.  
 
Table 3. The PIC Microcontroller PIC18F2550 Datasheet. 
Device 
Program Memory  Data Memory 
Flash (bytes)  # Single-Word Instruction SRAM (bytes) EEPROM (bytes)
PIC18F2455 24  K  12,288  2,048  256 
PIC18F2550 32  K  16,384  2,048  256 
PIC18F4455 24  K  12,288  2,048  256 
PIC18F4550 32  K  16,384  2,048  256 
6.2. Computation Analysis 
Considering the computational complexity, many studies have been conducted to address PKC for 
sensor networks. Gura et al. [31] established the elliptical curve cryptography signature verification 
needs of 1.62 s using 160-bit keys on ATmega 128 of 8 MHz CPU; the processor was used for a 
Crossbow motes platform [31]. These results illustrate that ECC-based algorithms are good to use. In 
addition, the protocol by Watro et al. [23] was implemented on MICA1 Motes [21]. These devices 
carry an Atmel ATmega 128L microcontroller running at 4 MHz with 4 KB of RAM and 128 KB of 
flash memory.  
This implementation was conducted over six years ago. Currently, there are many sensor nodes with 
high resources [32] compared with MICA1. In our study, an implementation of an elliptic curve 
cryptosystem on a Microchip PIC18FXX [30] family microcontroller is outlined. We designed a 
simple prototype diagram for our study [33] (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. The Schematic Diagram with the Interfaces Consideration. 
 
Figure 2 shows the schematic diagram of a simple sensor node. Each node consists of an Amplitude 
Shift Key transmitter and Receiver with a carrier frequency of 433 MHz for transmitting/receiving 
Microcontroller 
PIC18FXX 
Sensor Node  Sensor Node 
ASK 433MhZ TX/RX  Random Number 
Generator Circuit
Sensor Node  ……....Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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digital measurement data like temperature, light, etc. The ASK sensor is connected through the 
Microcontroller by using the digital Port of the microcontroller. The Random Number Generator 
Circuit feeds the microcontroller with random sequences that can be used for cryptography algorithms 
and key exchange techniques. 
We chose PIC18FXX [30] for many reasons [34]: it’s cheap, it’s widely used, it’s available at 
competitive prices, and it can be used easily in BSN. The 8-bit bus width along with the data memory 
and processor speed limitations present some additional challenges versus the implementation on a 
general purpose computer. All algorithms required to perform an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key 
have been implemented. To minimize the processing time, the hardware circuit was designed with a 
clock rate of 48 MHz, the maximum clock rate of the PIC18F2550 microcontroller. This 
microcontroller has an internal USB interface with minimal external parts required which led to a 
simplified design for our study. 
As the PIC18F2550 microcontroller and most 8 bit microcontrollers used in BSN do not contain a 
random number generator, it is necessary to either obtain random numbers from another source or 
incorporate a hardware random number generator into the design. For cryptographic uses, it is very 
important that random numbers be truly random and cannot be guessed or predicted in any way. For 
this problem, we designed a simple circuit for generating random sequences based on the avalanche 
effect. The circuit shown in Figure 2 was tested to provide the random noise input to the 
microcontroller. The base to the emitter junction of Q1 is used as the avalanche diode in this 
implementation.  
Figure 3 shows the circuit diagram that is used for generating random sequences using the   
semi-conductor characteristics of transistors. With that regard we tried to wire up a circuit diagram as 
shown at that figure. 
 
Figure 3. The Schematic Diagram for the Random Generator Circuit. 
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The involved capacitors in those circuits are called bypass capacitors [35], to which bypass high 
frequency signals from the power supply 12 VDC, so that we can get a clean Direct Current voltage, 
because high frequency signals may affect that random circuit generator.  
Results: The efficiency of each of the algorithms in the prime field was measured by counting the 
cycles used on a simulator and then verifying the results by running it in real hardware. The elliptic 
curve point addition, doubling, and multiplication results were calculated using the actual times from 
the prime field algorithms and the number required.  
Assuming that the communications time is negligible, the PIC18F2550 microcontroller can perform 
a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in approximately 5.4 seconds (two elliptic curve point multiplications). 
Table 4 shows our simulation results when we tried to implement a Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, 
we have simulated each arithmetic operation like addition, subtraction  to evaluate the performance on 
the chosen microcontroller PIC18FXX while implementing the key exchange. We computed the cycles 
that are consumed by the clock of the microcontroller and the time it takes to perform the arithmetic 
operations that are involved in the elliptic curve algorithm. After that we present a few techniques that 
can enhance the performance and increase the efficiency while implementing the elliptic on small 
microcontrollers that are usually used in body sensor networks. 
Table 4. The Algorithm Execution Time Efficiency. 
Algorithm Cycles  Time 
Addition  206 17.2  uS 
Subtraction  273 22.75  uS 
Multiplication  15,803 1,317  uS 
Modulus p reduction  12,790 1,066  uS 
Inverse 31,280  2,607  uS 
Elliptic Curve Point Addition (1 Inv, 6 Sub, 2 Mul)  64,524  5.4 mS 
Elliptic Curve Point Doubling (1 Inv, 5 Sub, 4 Mul)  95,857  8.0 mS 
Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication (256 EC Dbl, 128 EC Add)  32,798,464  2.73 S 
Assembly Coding Improvements: Most of the computationally intensive sections of this 
implementation have been coded in assembly language, which reduces the number of inefficiencies 
caused by a C compiler. Additional speed and memory efficiency may be gained by hand coding the 
entire implementation. This is a trade off with available time and readability versus possible negligible 
performance gains. 
Speeds versus Memory Tradeoff: Our implementation can be made faster by unrolling all of the 
loops in the software to eliminate the counts and compare those used for the looping operation. 
Conversely, it could also be made smaller (more memory efficient) by using recursion and additional 
looping. The tradeoff between speed versus memory should be considered in future implementations. 
The PIC18F2550 microcontroller is easily capable of performing an elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange. With a working time of 5.4 seconds per exchange, this type of cryptography is not 
suited to high speed data transfers for this particular device. For high-speed transfers, the exchanged 
secret may be used as the key in a symmetric cipher, such as Rijndael (as used in the Advanced 
Encryption Standard [37]). Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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RSA Implementation: For implementing the RSA Public-Key Encryption algorithm, we used the 
same configuration as in the Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman key: an 8 bit PIC18F2550 microcontroller, 
with a clock speed of 48 MHz. We measured the speed of a single block of data 512 bits key: 
Encryption: 2 s. 
Decryption: 120 s. 
We also tested another microcontroller, the dsPIC30F3013, which is a digital signal processor 
microcontroller with a Microchip
© with a clock speed of 30 MHz. 
Encryption: 0.2 s.  
Decryption: 15 s. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, considering the BSN security based on the public key mode, we have demonstrated a 
novel key management scheme with rekeying. This key agreement system establishes an ephemeral 
session key between sensor nodes with the participation of the gateway as a trusted third party. Group 
key distribution is very simple and the rekey messages are also authenticated. This facilitates the 
efficient renewal of group keys to cater for membership changes. The proposed protocol covers the 
rekeying property and considers the nodes addition and revocation from the viewpoint of secured key 
establishment. Rekeying, node addition and revocation features are the main shortcomings of this 
process as compared to previous algorithms.  
We achieved the security requirements without the utilization of a secure-limited channel, like in 
Balfanz [11], which requires huge resources. In addition, we didn’t go to the master-slave relationship, 
which destroys the key control property. From another viewpoint, our protocol establishes pair-wise 
keys between nodes according to a specific routing algorithm, instead of loading full pair-wise keys 
into each node. In this way, each node doesn’t have to share a key with all of its neighbors, except 
those involved in the routing path, which is the key role of increasing the resiliency against node 
capturing and storage efficiency. We also analyzed the security strength of our proposal with many 
desirable security attributes to deduce its success; our algorithm has been evaluated according to its 
performance behavior implemented with respect to many previous studies.  
Particularly, we consider some of the future areas in the study of security issues in BSN as follows. 
Many researchers have shown that public key operations may be practical in sensor nodes. However, 
private key operations are still too expensive to accomplish in a sensor node. As public key 
cryptography can greatly ease the design of security in BSN, improving the efficiency of private key 
operations on sensor nodes is highly desirable [36]. The mobility of sensor nodes has a great influence 
on sensor network architecture and sequentially on the routing protocols. New secure routing protocols 
for mobile BSN are needed to be created. Multimedia sensors might not be widely utilized for BSNs 
now, but will likely be in the near future. Substantial differences in authentication and encryption exist 
between discrete applications and continuous real time application, indicating that there will be 
distinctions between continuous stream security and the current protocols used in BSNs. Current 
studies on security in WSNs focus on individual topics such as key establishment, secure routing, Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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secure data aggregation, and intrusion detection. QoS and security services need to be evaluated 
together in BSN. 
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